Th is paper discusses the case law of the CJEU over the past fi ve years on the principle of nondiscrimination in relation to part-time and fi xed-term workers. Th is case law shows certain shortcomings when it comes to the principle of non-discrimination of part-time and fi xed-term workers, partly because the CJEU's room for interpretation itself of course is limited by EU regulations and partly because, as we shall see below, its own way of interpreting them. Th e contribution is structured as follows. First, a brief overview is provided on the limited reach of the principle of non-discrimination as framed in the Framework Agreements. Th is is followed by an analysis of the case law on part-time work and, aft er that, the case law on fi xed-term work. Th e conclusion addresses some of the main issues that raise due to the Framework Agreements' set-up and the CJEU's interpretation of them.
Introduc on
Despite the fact that current developments in the world of work imply that fl exible work relationships are inexorably on the rise, the standard employment relationship still is 'the norm' , 2 at MS and at EU level. Reasons why the EU legislator, together with the social partners, has introduced regulations on atypical employment relationships, and in particular the Part-time Work and Fixed-term Work Framework Agreements, 3 are twofold. First, to allow workers to balance work and family life, and, second, to allow employers to arrange work processes according to their particular needs, in a more fl exible way, without obliging them to always off er workers a full-time permanent -or standard -employment contract. Th is, it is said, addresses the needs of businesses and workers by balancing between fl exibility in working time and security for workers. Even though atypical employment relationships may have the potential to benefi t employers and workers alike, the Framework Agreements contain particular mechanisms aimed at balancing between diff erent interests at stake: to remove discrimination, to improve the quality of part-time and fi xed-term work and to prevent the abuse of successive fi xed-term contracts (Clauses 1 of the Framework Agreements). Rather than limiting the use of part-time work or fi xed-term work, these balancing mechanisms aim to facilitate the 'adequate' use of these two forms of work. Anne Davies helpfully discusses three 'questionable' assumptions on which the regulations on fi xed-term and part-time work, that try to 'normalize' non-standard work, are based: 4 (1) part-time and fi xed-term work are benefi cial to the worker; (2) these forms of work act as stepping stones; and (3) unequal treatment of non-permanent workers compared with standard workers as the main problem. Th e 'benefi ts argument' tends to refer to working-hours fl exibility rather than the duration or stability of the work relationship. While probably benefi ting part-time workers, this might not be the case for fi xed-term workers, whose work periods are frequently and repetitively interrupted. Th e European Commission uses the 'stepping stones' argument to support the idea that the Framework Agreements are 'inclusive' instruments for those who experience diffi culty in fi nding work or gaining access to the labour market. Non-standard work might then be used to lead -at least this is hoped for -to the sort of standard employment relationship which most people (still) seem to want. Finally, the 'unequal treatment argument' emphasizes equal treatment in terms of 'employment conditions' such as wage, health and safety, and working time. Nevertheless, a worker having a fi xed-term employment contract may still experience disadvantages because of unstable employment and a part-time worker may have to work on a casual basis making it diffi cult to predict the working schedule. It is in particular the 'unequal treatment argument' I wish to focus on here.
Th e case law over the past fi ve years, ranging from 2013 to 2018, show certain shortcomings when it comes to the principle of non-discrimination of part-time and fi xed-term workers, partly because the CJEU itself of course is limited by EU regulations in its interpretation thereof and partly because, as we shall see below, its own way of interpreting them. Th e contribution is structured as follows. First, a brief overview is provided on the limited reach of the principle of non-discrimination as framed in the Framework Agreements. Th is is followed by an analysis of the case law on part-time work and, aft er that, the case law on fi xed-term work. Th e conclusion addresses some of the main issues that raise due to the Framework Agreements' set-up and the CJEU's interpretation of them.
The principle of non-discrimina on and its limita ons
Following Clauses 4 of the Framework Agreements on Part-time and Fixed-term Work, in respect of employment conditions, part-time or fi xed-term workers shall not be treated in a less favourable manner than comparable full-time or permanent workers solely because they work part-time or on a fi xed-term unless diff erent treatment is justifi ed on objective grounds, such as the pro rata temporis principle. Th ree limitations can be derived from this non-discrimination provision in conjunction with the CJEU's interpretation thereof.
First, the principle of non-discrimination only applies to employment conditions, to the exclusion of social security. An alternative to using the Framework Agreement on part-time, for instance, would be to use a 'gender lens' . Th e diffi culty here, however, is that the part-time worker has to show that the rule disadvantages 5 a considerably higher percentage of women than men, or vice versa. 6 Part-time workers have to show a disparate impact, which is diffi cult where relevant statistics are not available or are incomplete. Moreover, male part-time workers are unable to bring a claim unless the usual circumstances are reversed, i.e. that full-time in their fi rm are mostly female and the disadvantaged part-timers mostly male. 7 Second, in order for a non-discrimination claim to be successful, the part-time or fi xed-term worker needs to fi nd a comparable full-time or permanent worker. Th is, however, does not include the possibility to compare with a hypothetical worker or former colleagues. 8 Also, the comparable worker must be in the same establishment engaged in same or similar work or occupation (presumably same type of contract). In Wippel, also the same type of contract (as she could refuse to work, there was no comparable full-time worker); presumably also applicable in relation to fi xed-term work. 9 Decisive is whether part-time or fi xed-term worker is in a comparable position as the full-time or permanent worker with a view to the respective employment condition; not a general comparison.
Th ird, where workers are treated less favourably because of their part-time or fi xed--term work employment contract or relationship, this seems to indicate that no other plausible reasons for the alleged discriminatory treatment may exist. 10 Reasons not related to the type of employment relationship or contract, therefore, seem to be excluded from the scope of the non-discrimination principle. While, in the following, the case law analysis is thematically organized, I will come back to the three limitations in my conclusion.
EU case law on part-me work
Th e cases dealt with in the following, can be grouped in three categories, namely cases on: the conversion from part-time into full-time work; the pro rata temporis principle; and the relation with social security benefi ts.
Conversion from part-me into full-me work: comparable situa on? In Mascellani, 11 Ms Mascellani's worked on a part-time basis, aft er conversion of her full--time contract, so that she could use her free time to care for her family and to undertake vocational training. Her employer, relying on Italian law, however, unilaterally (re)converted her part-time contract into a full-time contract. Th us, the question was whether this (re)conversion is discriminatory. Referring to the principle of non-discrimination, the CJEU emphasises that Clause 4 seeks to eliminate discrimination between full-time and part-time workers in respect of employment conditions. Advocate General Wahl argues that the principle of non-discrimination applies not to the 'risk for the part-time worker that the daily amount of time devoted to working may be adjusted against his will' . Th e CJEU rejects that part-time workers and full-time workers whose contracts are converted into full-time or part-time employment are not in a comparable situation. In line with AG's Opinion, the CJEU stresses that there is a diff erence between the conversion of full-time work into part-time and vice versa, because reducing working time does not involve the same consequences as an increase in working time, in particular, as regards the worker's remuneration as consideration for work carried out. It should be stressed that changing working time unilaterally can harm part-time workers and full-time workers equally. While the former may not be able to combine work and family life anymore in case working time is extended, the latter may experience a loss of income. Especially this last, economically induced point, the worker's livelihood, seems relevant for the CJEU as well as the fact that the Framework Agreement obliges Member States to facilitate part-time work on a voluntary basis while also contributing to the fl exible organization of working time speaking to the needs of employers and workers. Part-time work in this case already was facilitated, and it seems that once facilitated, there is no need to guarantee part-time work anymore.
Pro rata temporis principle: jus fying a diff erence in treatment
In Österreichischer Gewerkschaft sbund, a case on calculating dependent child allowance, the Austrian Trade Union Confederation sought a declaration that part-time workers falling within the scope of the collective agreement are entitled to payment of the 'full amount of the dependent child allowance' provided by that collective agreement and not only an amount calculated on a pro rata temporis basis.
12 According to the CJEU, child allowances constitute 'pay' under Art 157(2) TFEU. Th e legal nature of the consideration is not important for the purposes of Art 157 TFEU provided that it is granted in respect of the employment. 13 Since the dependent child allowance is part of a worker's pay, it is determined by the terms of the employment relationship agreed between the worker and the employer. Th us, if a worker is employed part-time, calculating the dependent child allowance in accordance with the pro rata temporis principle is objectively justifi ed. Quite frequently, CJEU has equated pay under the Framework Agreement with pay under the TFEU. Th e dependent child allowance, like a retirement pension 14 or paid annual leave, 15 is a divisible benefi t, and the reduced working time compared with that of a full-time worker constitutes an objective criterion allowing a proportionate reduction of the rights of the workers concerned. 16 In that way, the pro rata temporis principle incorporates its own objective justifi cation. Notably, as this Framework Agreement does not apply to statutory dependent child allowances, it may be possible that the pro rata temporis principle is not interpreted as strictly as it is done here.
Th e Greenfi eld case concerned the calculation of payment in lieu upon termination of the contract for paid annual leave not taken. 17 Ms Greenfi eld worked under a contract of employment which stipulated that the working hours and days diff ered from week to week. Th e remuneration payable for any week varied according to the number of days or hours of work performed. Based on varying weekly working hours, a dispute arose about the payment in lieu for paid annual leave not taken upon the termination of Ms Greenfi eld's employment contract with her employer. In dispute was whether the Framework Agreement in conjunction with Art 7 Directive 2003/88/EC on working time requires a Member State to recalculate the amount of paid annual leave -even retroactively over the whole year -according to the worker's (fl exible) work pattern. Th e CJEU ruled that the entitlement to paid annual leave must be calculated with regard to the work pattern specifi ed in the contract. However, already accrued paid annual leave -a social right which the CJEU is keen on protecting -cannot be infl uenced by any later alterations as to the number of working hours. Th at means that in case the working hours increase, paid annual leave increases accordingly. Following the CJEU, already accrued 12 Case C-476/12 Österreichischer Gewerkschaft sbund ECLI:EU:C:2014:2332. 13 Case C-281/97 Krüger ECLI:C:EU:1999:396, para 16. 14 Case C-4/02 and C-5/02 Schönheit and Becker ECLI:EU:2003:583, paras 90-91. 15 Case C-486/08 Zentralbetriebsrat der Landeskrankenhäuser Tirols ECLI:EU:C2010:215, para 33. 16 Unlike a protective helmet, as the AG in her Opinion notes, para 25para 24. 17 Case C-219/14 Greenfi eld ECLI:EU:C2015:745.
rights cannot be taken away, therefore EU law requires a new calculation of rights to paid annual leave to be performed only for the period of work during which the worker increased the number of hours worked. Th is case is of practical importance, making clear that once acquired, a worker may not be deprived of her rights granted by EU law.
Th e calculation of the amount of occupational pension accrued by part-time worker who left the undertaking before the occurrence of the pensionable event was subject in the Kleinsteuber case.
18 Ms Kleinsteuber was employed between October 1990 and May 2014 in various positions, both full-time and part-time. Her rates of activity were between 50 and 75% of the activity of a full-time employee. Having reached the age of 55, she enjoys the right to an occupational pension. However, she challenges the way in which her employer calculated the pension. Th e CJEU was asked to answer whether it is compatible with the Framework Agreement in conjunction with Art 4 Directive 2006/54/EC, to determine the amount of an occupational pension, to distinguish between employment income falling below the ceiling for the calculation of contributions to the statutory pension scheme and employment income above that ceiling. Th e alternative, which Ms Kleinsteuber suggested, would treat income from part-time employment by calculating fi rst the income payable in respect of corresponding full-time employment. However, according to the CJEU, the employer's method to calculate the occupational pension scheme does not result in discrimination against part-time workers. It seems that, based on a strict application of the pro rata temporis principle, the rate was 71.5%, i.e. the ratio between worker's actual years of service throughout her career and the years of service of a worker worked full-time during her entire career. Taking into account the worker's actual years of service is an objective criterion unrelated to any discrimination, allowing her pension entitlement to be reduced proportionately. 19 When it comes to calculating benefi ts, the CJEU quite easily seems to accept the national methods adopted, provided, however, they are transparent and the method itself is non-discriminatory, even if leading to diff erent outcomes. Th e principle of non-discrimination does not require that part-time and full-time workers benefi t from the same outcome even if on a pro rata temporis basis. Whether this can be considered 'fair' can be debated, but the method itself is objective.
Rela on with social security benefi ts
Although the following cases deal with social security schemes, not being employment conditions within the Framework Agreement, and in particular the methods of calculation thereof, these cases are relevant for the CJEU's interpretation of indirect discrimination and the diffi culties with providing statistical evidence.
Th e Cachaldora Fernández case on the method of calculating the invalidity pension concerned the interpretation of Directive 79/7 on the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security and Framework Agreement.
20 Ms Fernández worked full-time and part-time between 1971 and 2010 -except between 1998-2002 -and contributed to the social security system. She disagrees about the way her invalidity pension has been calculated, and in particular, the reference period, as her part-time employment falls largely within the eight year reference period used to calculate the actual pension.
21 Th e question is whether the Directive excludes provisions which provide that the contribution gaps existing within the reference period calculating a contributory invalidity pension, aft er having worked part-time, are taken into account at the level of the minimum contribution bases applicable at any time, reduced as a result of the reduction of that employment. For gaps during full-time employment, or in case someone has not worked at all, no such reduction is made. Th e CJEU found that the Spanish rule was not applicable to all part-time workers; it only applied to workers who have had a gap in their contributions during the reference period of eight years preceding the date of the event giving rise to the invalidity, when that gap followed a period of part-time work.
22 Th e CJEU also emphasised that some women might even benefi t, in particular if they have worked part-time before the reference period while working full-time during the reference period; their pension would then be overvalued in relation to the contributions actually paid. Th us, this cannot lead to the conclusion that the group of disadvantaged workers is mostly female.
What is problematic in this case is that the invalidity pension is not an employment condition under the Framework Agreement on Part-time Work, and that, therefore, it is not possible to compare between full-time and part-time workers. Th e only option is to argue that there has been sex discrimination, but that means that the applicant has to produce evidence proving that indeed a larger proportion of women than men are hit by the rule. Interestingly, following an example the Commission provided, where a worker during the reference period worked part-time for four years, full-time for six months, ceased her occupational activity for three years and then worked full-time for another six months, the period of inactivity here will be assimilated to a situation of having worked full-time (i.e. four years full-time work even if only actually worked full-time for one year). Even though Ms Fernández has worked full-time for most of the time (notably, the applicant contributed to the system for 39 years, three years and ten months of which part-time), except before the occurrence of event giving rise to invalidity, she is 'punished' for working part-time.
In Espadas Recio, on unemployment benefi ts of so-called 'vertical' part-time workers, Ms Espadas Recio, aft er having worked as a cleaner between 1999 and 2013, became unemployed aft er her employment contract was terminated. 
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on the method for calculating her unemployment benefi t, she was granted a benefi t of 120 days, extended to 420 days aft er fi ling a complaint. Still not satisfi ed, she argued in court that she, as a 'vertical' part-time worker, i.e. someone who concentrates working hours on certain days of the week rather than working on every working day of the week, 'horizontal' part-time worker has been treated diff erently. Ms Espadas Recio paid for six full years preceding her termination, but national law at issue permits only the days worked to be taken into account and not the entire contribution period, thus the duration of that benefi t is reduced because only days worked are taken into account, even though the contribution period is longer. 'Horizontal' part-time workers or full-time workers, on the other hand, are treated more favourably. Th e majority of vertical part-time worker is women, adversely aff ected by that national law. According to the CJEU, although the contributions are paid pursuant to an employment relationship, the unemployment benefi ts are paid because of the law determining so, similar to a state-administered social security scheme and cannot be considered 'employment conditions' . Addressing the issue of indirect discrimination, the CJEU emphasizes that this case diff ers from the Cachaldora Fernández case, dealt with earlier, because (1) the CJEU did not have irrefutable statistical information regarding the number of part-time workers who had had a gap in their contributions or showing that that group of workers was principally made up of women and (2) the provisions had random eff ects, since some part-time workers could even benefi t from the application of that provision. In Espadas Recio, it seems relevant that the statistical information produced is not contested. And, regarding the statistical information, the data covers 'vertical' and 'horizontal' part-time workers equally, indicating that in both groups there is a greater proportion of women than men that will be adversely aff ected. Th us, there is a diff erence in treatment to the detriment of women. As Advocate General Sharpston emphasized, on many occasions the CJEU has ruled that because the statistical data relating to part-time workers in general could not demonstrate that women comprised the great majority in the group of part-time workers, not all situations led to indirect discrimination. Unlike in the Espadas Recio case, in the Fernández case, the precise group of part-time workers could not be clearly identifi ed. As the Advocate General notes, the Spanish rule does take into account (i) the period during which contributions are made by the worker and her employer, (ii) the amount of those contributions and (iii) the working hours of the worker concerned, but only for full-time workers and 'horizontal' part-time workers. Th e measurements should therefore equally apply to 'vertical' part-time workers.
EU case law on fi xed-term work
Over the past fi ve years, more cases dealt with fi xed-term employment (most them in Spain) than with part-time work, addressing various employment conditions, some of which were ruled discriminatory while others not.
Length-of-service increments
Th e Regojo Dans case addressed three-yearly length-of-service increments.
24 Applicant was employed as non-permanent member of staff since March 1996, holding the post of head of the secretariat of a Permanent Member of the Council. In January 2012, she claims that she had a right to receive three-yearly length-of-service increments. National legislation excludes, without objective justifi cation, non-permanent staff from the right to receive three-yearly length-of-service increments granted to career civil servants. Obviously, three-yearly length-of-service increments constitute employment conditions. Th us, non-permanent staff has to be compared with a career civil servant. According to the Spanish government, non-permanent staff constitutes a professional category distinct from other categories of civil servants. And unlike career civil servants who are selected, non-permanent staff are appointed on a discretionary basis in order to carry out specifi c, non-permanent duties entailing trust or special advice. Termination of their employment is also discretionary and occurs automatically on termination of the appointment of the postholder for whom the duties are discharged. In case the national court rules the two types of workers to be comparable, it has to be assessed whether the diff erence can be objectively justifi ed. Th e CJEU rules that there is, however, no objective ground where career civil servants on secondment can and do hold posts reserved for non-permanent staff while receiving the three-yearly length-of-service increments. Th is would be contrary to the argument that the particular nature of the duties entailing trust and special advice justifi es a diff erence in treatment.
Special leave
In Vega González, the CJEU addressed the special leave for the election to the public offi ce to serve as a member of parliament. 25 Granting special service leave is part of the employment relationship and hence an employment conditions. Following the CJEU, it is important to identify whether there is a comparable permanent worker which performs the same or similar work. Th ere is a diff erence of treatment between fi xed--term workers and permanent workers, since the latter may be granted special service leave whilst a fi xed-term worker must resign from his post in order to hold the same offi ce. Th e national judge has to decide whether Ms Vega González is in a comparable situation as a permanent worker. Spain argued that it was the worker's deliberate and unilateral decision to take special leave because of being elected to the public offi ce. Th e CJEU does not accept this reasoning, since a permanent worker in the same situation would have been faced with the same need. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the person will be elected. An interesting point AG Sharpston makes in reaction to this statement is that the reason why the worker wants to take leave is entirely irrelevant.
Th e reasoning brought forward by the Spanish government is 'akin to claiming that, since a female worker's employer is not (at least normally) involved in her decision to become pregnant, she should therefore not be able to benefi t from maternity leave' . While the national court must assess whether the fi xed-term worker is in a comparable situation as a permanent worker, the CJEU adds that, in case the court comes to such a conclusion, the predictability of the end of the employment relationship, could, in principle, constitute precise and concrete factors capable of justifying inequality of treatment as regards the granting of special service leave, such arguments do not apply in the underlying situation where the post has been occupied for more than four years by the same temporary worker. Principally, the CJEU sees no reason why such leave could not be granted to a fi xed-term worker, provided the job has not been abolished or fi lled by an established civil servant.
No ce period
In the Nierodzik case, a dispute arose about the notice period for terminating a fi xed--term employment contract.
26 From May 1986 until February 2010, Ms Nierodzik was employed, mostly on a permanent employment contract until the contract was terminated by mutual agreement, as the employee wished to take early retirement. However, at the same time a fi xed-term contract to work part-time was concluded for the period from February 2010 until February 2015. Th at contract contained a clause based on which the employer could unilaterally terminate the contract with a two-week notice period, without justifi cation, which the employer invoked in April 2012. Polish law provides for fi xed-term contracts concluded for longer than six months, a notice period of two weeks, and for permanent contracts a notice period because two weeks and three months. Th e CJEU emphasizes that the principle of non-discrimination prevents the employer using such an employment relationship to deny those workers rights which are granted to permanent workers. 27 Conditions relating to dismissals, including notice periods, are employment conditions. Th e fact that the applicant occupied the same post before she entered into a fi xed-term contract may support the fact that she was in a comparable situation to a person with a permanent contract. Th us, applying diff erent notice periods constitutes diff erent treatment. As the diff erence of treatment between the two types of employment contracts lies in their length and the stability of the employment relationship, relying on the mere temporary nature of the employment is not capable of constituting an objective ground. It is in particular this ground to which the principle of non-discrimination applies.
Payment of compensa on
Most of the fi xed-term work cases deal with the payment of compensation. To start, diff erent types of compensation for terminating fi xed-term employment contracts applied in the Carratù case: compensation for the unlawful insertion of a fi xed-term clause into an employment relationship payment in respect of unlawful termination of a permanent employment relationship.
28 Th e question was whether the two must be treated in the same way. From 4 June until 15 September 2004, Ms Carratù was employed to replace a member of staff employed with Poste Italiane. Aft er her employment terminated, she sent a letter by registered post from 21 September 2004, that she is available for work. As the conciliation procedure was unsuccessful, she brought proceedings against Poste Italiane in September 2008. In a ruling from 25 January 2012, the Italian court determined that the fi xed-term clause has been unlawful and that Ms Carratù had a permanent employment relationship as of 4 June 2004. As the concept employment conditions has not been expressly defi ned by Framework Agreement on Fixed-term Work, the CJEU relies on its case law on the Framework Agreement on Part-time Work. Clearly, the compensation paid on account of the unlawful insertion of a fi xed-term clause into an employment contract is compensation paid on account of employment. But, is Ms Carratù in a comparable situation as a permanent worker?
29 Not addressing this issue, the CJEU stresses that the two compensations diff er: the fi rst is paid to compensate for an unlawfully concluded employment contract, whereas the second is paid to employees who have been dismissed. Th us, the principle of non-discrimination did not apply.
In the Pérez López case, the CJEU again found that there was no comparable worker, because of the diff erence between statutory and contractual employment. 30 Between February 2009 and March 2013, Ms Pérez López was without interruption employed as a nurse at a university hospital in Madrid (seven renewed fi xed-term contracts). National legislation fails to provide compensation for termination of a contract of employment to occasional regulated staff while such compensation is paid to comparable workers employed under contracts for occasional employment. Th e diff erence in treatment, the CJEU established, is not based on the fi xed-term or permanent nature of the employment relationship, but whether the fi xed-term nature of the contract is statutory or contractual. Applicant wanted the CJEU to compare between diff erent categories of fi xed-term workers which falls outside the scope of the principle of non-discrimination. Th at would be diff erent if the referring court fi nds that workers employed under a permanent contract doing comparable work are paid compensation for termination of a contract of employment, whereas such compensation is not paid to fi xed-term workers. While in line with the Framework Agreement the CJEU's ruling is correct, it nevertheless creates the problem that the status of the worker, i.e. whether the employment relationship is of a statutory or contractual nature, becomes decisive for the level of protection granted. Th is is particularly worrisome where the state increasingly excludes some forms of employment because of the rights and obligations that would otherwise be involved. Also in Diego Porras, the legislation failed to provide compensation for terminating a fi xed-term contract while allowing compensation to comparable permanent workers.
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Ms Diego Porras' contract, aft er having been employed on several fi xed-term contracts, was terminated so as to allow the reinstatement of the worker she replaced. Th e Spanish court raises doubts as to the compensation for termination of the employment relationship: the legal termination of a permanent contract is 20 days' salary for each year of service, while only 12 days' salary for each year of service if on a fi xed-term contract. It is clear, so the CJEU, that compensation is an employment condition. But is there a comparable permanent worker? It follows from the fi le submitted to the CJEU that the applicant did work similar or identical to that of a permanent worker, i.e. she was replacing someone with a permanent contract for seven years who was on leave to carry out trade union work. As to the objective justifi cation of the diff erence in treatment, the CJEU made clear that neither the temporary nature nor the absence of any provision regarding granting compensation constitute objective grounds.
Th e Grupo Norte case, in which mother and son shared a job due to the mother's partial retirement, the CJEU faced the question whether the situation of a fi xed-term worker and a permanent worker in terms of compensation on termination of the contract can be considered as comparable. 32 Although it is for the national court to determine whether Mr Moreira Gómez, who was employed under a fi xed-term relief employment contract, was in a situation comparable to that of permanent employees, the CJEU stressed that he occupied the same post of cleaner at the hospital as the worker he partially relieved pending her full retirement. Th e situation of Mr Moreira Gómez is therefore comparable to that of a permanent worker. Addressing whether there is an objective reason justifying the diff erence in treatment, Spanish law off ers, as we have seen in Diego Porras dealt with above, diff erent compensations: the legal termination of a permanent contract granting 20 days' salary for each year of service when terminating a permanent contract and 12 days' salary for terminating a fi xed-term contract. Th e Spanish government argues that, and the CJEU agrees, there are diff erent aims that underlie these compensations: compensation for the expiry of a fi xed-term contract (i.e., a foreseeable event) and compensation in the event of collective dismissal, paid to compensate for the unforeseen nature of the termination of the employment relationship, to compensate any frustration that may arise due to legitimate expectations the worker may have had at that date as regards the stability of that relationship. In addition, the compensation is paid to fi xed-term and permanent workers alike; hence, there is no unequal treatment.
Montero Mateos, ruled on the same date as the Grupo Norte case, concerned the situation of Ms Montero Mateos who worked as an assistant in a residential home for elderly persons run by an agency on the basis of a temporary replacement contract to replace a permanent worker. 33 Th at contract was converted to a temporary replacement contract to fi ll a vacant post temporarily. Aft er a recruitment procedure, the post was assigned to a person and thus Ms Montero Mateos' temporary replacement contract ended. She claimed that she performed the same tasks as the person who had been hired, however without having received any compensation whereas such compensation is paid to the termination of a fi xed-term and permanent contract. It is clear from the evidence available to the CJEU that Ms Montero Mateos carried out the same tasks as an assistant in a residential home for elderly persons as those that the person selected was recruited to carry out and the purpose of the selection was precisely to fi ll her post. Nevertheless, not granting compensation to workers on temporary replacement contracts can be justifi ed by precise and specifi c factors, namely that it was clear that once a replacement was found, Mrs Montero Mateos' contract would automatically end. While indeed fi xed-term contracts automatically come to an end either on a specifi c date or on the occurrence of a specifi c event, and there may also be no legitimate expectation with the fi xed-term worker that his employment will be continued, not paying a compensation at all for that 'objective justifi cation' seems to contribute to the fact that fi xed-term work is a cheaper alternative to full-time employment. Th e latter becomes even more the case where an increasing number of rights are not granted to fi xed-term workers because of the objective justifi cation that there contract comes, in one way or the other, to an end. A possible alternative approach could be to pay a compensation for the fact that the worker may need a fi nancial buff er to cope with unemployment or to undergo training to fi nd a new job.
Right to reinstatement
Th e last case to be dealt with is Vernaza Ayovi, which concerned the question whether there is a right to reinstatement. 34 Ms Vernaza Ayovi was employed as a nurse from May 2006, fi rst on a fi xed-term, later on a permanent contract. Aft er being on leave on personal grounds for more than a year, in June 2014, she asked to be reinstated, but was informed that there were no suitable or equivalent nursing positions in her previous specialism available. As a result, Ms Vernaza Ayovi participated in fi ve unsuccessful internal recruitment procedures. Finally, awarded a part-time, late-shift position on the basis of a 'non-permanent contract of indefi nite duration' , she was unwilling to accept any change to the employment conditions applicable prior to her leave and in May 2016 she rejected the duty roster which had been issued to her. She then failed to turn up for work. She was dismissed in July 2016 on disciplinary grounds for absence from work without leave. In case of an unlawful dismissal a permanent (public servant) worker has the right to reinstatement, whereas such a right is not granted to fi xed-term workers, leading to the question whether there is a diff erence in treatment. Given that notice periods are employment conditions, the CJEU, by analogy, rules that also the right to reinstatement is an employment condition. As to the comparability of the fi xed-term worker with the permanent worker, the CJEU emphasized that they were in a comparable situation. With a view to the question whether this diff erence can be justifi ed, the general rule applicable in the event of 'wrongful' or 'unlawful' dismissal determines that the employer may choose to reinstate the worker; and only in exceptional circumstances, the worker must be reinstated. While the method of recruitment itself cannot justify a diff erence in treatment, the CJEU found that considerations based on the characteristics of the law governing the national civil service, such as protecting permanent workers who passed a competition for recruitment to the public service by off ering job stability, can. Th e conditions of impartiality, effi ciency and independence of the administration, which have no counterpart in standard employment law, imply a certain permanence and stability of employment explain and justify the limitations on the power of public employers unilaterally to terminate employment contracts. Consequently, the automatic reinstatement of permanent workers takes place, factually and legally, in a signifi cantly diff erent context to that in which non-permanent workers fi nd themselves. Th us, the unequal treatment is justifi ed. Unlike the CJEU, Advocate General Kokott saw no reason why a fi xed-term worker could not be reinstated for the remaining term of her fi xed-term contract. Th e purposes of reinstatement are to put right an unlawful act by the employer the consequences of which are far-reaching given its impact on the continued existence of the employment relationship and to satisfy the worker's legitimate expectation that her employment relationship will continue in being for the duration of its normal term. From that point of view, there is no diff erence between a permanent and fi xed-term worker. Furthermore, the unlawful termination by the employer of an ongoing employment relationship is no less unlawful when it aff ects a fi xed-term worker than when a permanent worker falls victim to it. She further emphasises that there is no danger of any principles of public service employment being adversely aff ected where a fi xed-term work who has been wrongfully dismissed is granted a right to reinstatement (she does not acquire permanent employment nor does the status of fi xed-term worker change in another way).
Analysis and conclusion
Aft er having discussed the recent case law on the non-discrimination principle in the context of part-time and fi xed-term work over the past fi ve years, it becomes clear that the three limitations of that principle as indicated above, still are refl ected in the cases.
In relation to the concept employment conditions, it becomes clear that, in particular in relation to part-time work where a work-related benefi t, such as a social security benefi t, which is not considered an employment condition, leads to a situation in which female workers need to ground their discrimination claim on the basis of Directive 79/9 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security. Th ere has thus been a shift from the type of employment relationship to the aspect of gender as a potential ground on which the diff erent treatment can be based. However, and this can be disadvantageous as we have seen in the Cachaldora Fernández case, because a 'gender lens' is put on, female workers face the diffi culty in producing the right statistical evidence. It is interesting to see that the CJEU accepted data from diff erent groups of part-time workers (vertical vs horizontal), because it can be assumed that this only is the case where there is also a group of comparable full-time workers with whom the part-time worker must be compared. However, this would mean that the data must take into account diff erent forms of part-time work organisation. Nevertheless, a measure like the one in the Cachaldora Fernández case, is particularly harmful for workers working part-time, even where the method to calculate an invalidity pension is objective, its eff ect may be detrimental to those who, during the reference period applied prior to the event that led to the right of such pension. Th e CJEU's argument that not all part-time workers were aff ected but only those who had a gap during the reference period, fails to acknowledge that it is still the part-time employment that has led to the reduction of the benefi t, even if most of the time work was performed on a full-time basis. Showing less favourable treatment of female workers is limited to the applicable employment condition at hand and does not cover a broader range. Th e exclusion of social security form the Framework Agreement and instead using a gender lens is not able to redress any disadvantages and does not achieve any structural change.
In line with this, the CJEU's reasoning in the Mascellani case, where it said that the conversion from full-time to part-time is diff erent than the other way round, is problematic as well. Where a full-time employment relationship has been converted into a part-time employment relationship, because the worker had personal reasons, like family and/or care obligations, it is true that this results in a decrease in the remuneration and reduces any rights and benefi ts accordingly. However, if that relationship is reconverted into one of full-time, this may increase the remuneration and thus improve the worker's livelihood, but it creates a problem of time for the worker concerned. Even though many situations, such a care for children or other family members can be done by professionals, workers may have reasons not to outsource these tasks. A unilateral reconversion then would take away a choice on behalf of the worker.
While considering a right or benefit to be an employment condition is rather unproblematic in the context of fi xed-term work, at least as far as the abovementioned cases are concerned, the comparability of the fi xed-term worker with a permanent worker might be problematic if there is no 'opposite' worker. It is not possible to compare between diff erent categories of fi xed-term workers, or part-time workers, as the Framework Agreement aims to guarantee non-discrimination in comparison with a comparable permanent worker. What the cases above show is that while there may NON DISCRIMINATION OF PART TIME AND FIXED TERM WORKERS IN RECENT EU CASE LAW be comparable workers, where the purposes of the applicable employment conditions, such as the compensation in case of termination of the employment contract, diff er, there is nobody to compare with. While this seems a reasonable conclusion, the Montero Mateos case shows that the fact that a fi xed-term contract ends on the occurrence of a specifi c event, even if it is unknown when this specifi c event will happen, this can be an objective reason justifying the fact that no compensation is paid at all. Such termination is not comparable with, for instance, an unlawful termination of the contract. However, this also gives a reason to use fi xed-term contracts as they, unless otherwise provided by national law, end automatically upon a certain date or the occurrence of a specifi c event while off ering an objective justifi cation for not paying a compensation in case of a replacement contract concluded until the post has been fi lled.
In the cases dealing with the pro rata temporis principle in the context of part-time work, the CJEU in some cases assumed that the applicable conditions was an employment condition. Also, where it was clear that the method to calculate certain benefi ts did not distinguish between part-time workers and full-time workers, no reference was made to a 'comparable worker' (assuming that the two were indeed comparable). Th e CJEU quite easily accepts a 'diff erence in treatment' caused by applying the pro rata temporis principle in part-time cases where the methods to calculate employment conditions are non-discriminatorily applicable. As long as the same methods to establish a particular payment, like dependent child allowance or occupational pension, are used for both the full-time and the part-time worker, the CJEU applies the pro rata temporis principle quite strictly. Th is seems to be in line with the principle that part-time workers are not to be treated less favourably than full-time workers are. Member States may of course provide more favourable rules if they wish.
Where a Member State allows a diff erence in treatment just because it concerns a part-time or fi xed-term contract, the CJEU strictly applies the non-discrimination principle. In Nierodzik, the CJEU clearly ruled that the diff erence of treatment between the two types of employment contracts lies in their length and the stability of the employment relationship, and therefore, relying on the mere temporary nature of the employment is not capable of constituting an objective ground justifying a diff erence in treatment. Th e Pérez López case diff ers on this point, as here, where the diff erence in treatment, the CJEU ruled, is not based on the fi xed-term or permanent nature of the employment relationship, but whether the fi xed-term nature of the contract is statutory or contractual. Hence, applicant wanted the CJEU to compare between diff erent categories of fi xed-term workers and this falls outside the scope of the principle of non-discrimination.
